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Abstract 
Direct democracy practices such as initiatives and referenda are increasingly ignored or 
circumvented by political leaders who allocate subsidies toward new professional sport stadium 
developments.  In a democracy, such a means of governing may be problematic if the outcome is 
unreflective of the public will.  The existing literature makes several theoretical connections for 
this line of political decision-making, including urban growth machines and trustee–delegate 
representation.  In this paper, these concepts are integrated with empirical evidence to support 
the conceptualization of civic paternalism, a term that provides partial description of the political 
decision-making process.  Civic paternalists justify their decisions by arguing that a city’s 
continued vibrancy and growth optimize community benefit while remaining acutely aware of 
their decisions’ political consequences.  We illustrate the concept of civic paternalism by 
drawing from interviews with political leaders associated with one of the most recent cases of the 
no-vote subsidy. 
Keywords: public policy, political science, public subsidies, public sport facilities, sport finance, 
stadium construction
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Civic Paternalism in Political Policymaking: The Public Justification For No-vote Stadium 
Subsidies 
The literature related to stadium financing and voting outcomes has ranged widely (cf. 
Brown & Paul, 2002; Buist & Mason, 2010; deMause & Cagan, 2008; Hyatt, 2007; Mondello & 
Anderson, 2004; Spirou, 2011; Trumpbour, 2006).  Still, nearly all of this diverse literature 
shares the broad project of identifying the factors contributing to the passage or defeat of 
stadium-financing ballot issues.  Implicitly assumed in this research agenda is that the tools of 
direct democracy—namely, the initiative and the referendum—are regularly used to determine 
the extent of public support in stadium projects.  Indeed, some scholars have characterized direct 
democracy and stadium finance as having a very close relationship.  Coates and Humphreys 
(2003) noted that stadium referenda “occur frequently” (p. 1), while Dehring, Depken, and Ward 
(2008) claimed that the decision to subsidize a stadium “is often finalized at the ballot box” (p. 
156). 
Prior to the mid-2000s, those claims could be made with little disagreement.  Brown and 
Paul (2002) identified 40 stadium referenda spanning 1984 to 2000, and Mondello and Anderson 
(2004) observed 26 referenda across 19 cities from 1990 to 2000.  However, as discussed in this 
paper, a growing trend in stadium finance is the prevalence of the no-vote subsidy, in which 
elected officials and public servants allocate public funds toward the construction or renovation 
of a professional sport stadium without public consent (i.e., without the introduction of an 
initiative or referendum).  This practice is not entirely new—as Eisinger (2000) noted, 
“Referenda on whether to commit public funds to the construction of big entertainment amenities 
are not in fact the norm” (p. 323)—but it is becoming an increasingly ubiquitous practice.  Since 
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2005, 24 stadium projects representing nearly 90% of all stadium development have been 
allocated over $8.5 billion of public funds without any form of voter approval. 
In instances of no-vote subsidies, it is unclear whether the common interests of ordinary 
citizens are reflected in the policies of the local government.  Those operating in a system in 
which the actions of elected officials are incongruent with the wishes of their voting 
constituencies are compelling, and it is important to consider the reasoning of elected officials 
who make such controversial decisions.  The purpose of this study is to consider why decision-
makers elect to allocate municipal funds toward professional sport stadium projects without the 
endorsement of the public collective. 
To achieve this aim, we employ an interdisciplinary approach designed to appreciate the 
diverse academic disciplines in which this topic is relevant.  First, we follow Santo’s (2005) 
counsel to utilize a case-study approach when exploring the nuances of individual stadium-
finance issues; additionally, we highlight one of the most recent cases of the no-vote subsidy in 
professional sport.  Next, we summarize the relevant literature related to urban growth machine 
theory and models of political representation.  We then integrate this literature into our 
conceptualization of civic paternalism as the public justification of policymakers for no-vote 
subsidies.  Finally, we present empirical evidence that support our contention and discuss the 
theoretical and practical implications of the study. 
Democracy and the Rise of the No-vote Subsidy in Columbus, Ohio 
In a representative democracy, delegates are selected to act on behalf of their 
constituents.  In this form of democracy, elected officials are encouraged, and expected, to 
consider the best interests of all of their citizens (Magleby, 1984).  Comparatively, direct 
democracy provides citizens with the opportunity to participate directly in the legislative process.  
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Referenda and initiatives are forms of direct democracy because they allow citizens to vote 
directly on legislation, even in democracies that are otherwise structured on the representative 
model.  Historically, the pursuit of public money for a sport stadium culminated in a vote by 
local citizens.  As Fort (1997) noted, the primary reason for democratizing the stadium-finance 
issue was simply to adhere to legal requirements related to changing tax protocols or issuing 
bonds.  When an initiative or referendum is not legally required, public officials nevertheless 
often included it on a ballot in order to defer the decision to local citizens.  In addition, Fort 
argued, the purpose of the democratic process (i.e., voting) is to ensure that the desires of the 
majority are realized in policymaking.  However, as discussed previously and shown in Table 1, 
public votes on stadium-finance issues are no longer routine: only five public votes (four of 
which expressed approval) have occurred in cities subsidizing stadium projects from 2005 to 
2012. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
One of the most recent no-vote subsidies was awarded in Columbus, Ohio.  In May 1997, 
voters there rejected a referendum that would have increased the local sales tax over three years, 
thereby generating an expected $203.5 million which, along with investments from private 
corporations and contributions from the state of Ohio, was to have been used for a development 
in downtown Columbus anchored by a 21,000-seat multipurpose arena.  However, voters 
defeated the referendum 56.3% to 43.7% (Brown & Paul, 2002; Curry, Schwirian, & Woldoff, 
2004).  Columbus voters had previously rejected similar referenda in 1978 (65% no), 1981 (79% 
no), 1986 (53% no), and 1987 (56% no; “Key Dates,” 2011).  Just one month after the 1997 vote, 
plans for arena development resurfaced.  Private investors agreed to finance the $150 million 
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required for the arena, eliminating the need for local subsidies.  Ground was broken for 
Nationwide Arena in May 1998, and the National Hockey League’s Columbus Blue Jackets 
began play there in 2000.  The sequence of events in Columbus was a clear—though cursory—
example of the efficacy of the will of the people: individuals were provided the opportunity to 
vote in matters affecting them; public sentiment was reflected in the policymaking outcome; and 
this view was acknowledged and adhered to during subsequent arena planning (i.e., Nationwide 
Arena was built through private investment). 
The Nationwide Arena resolution turned out not to be the final decision on the funding of 
this facility, however.  In late 2011 and early 2012, Columbus city council members and Franklin 
County commissioners approved plans for the city and county to purchase Nationwide Arena 
using $42.5 million of tax revenues generated from a newly constructed casino in the city.  The 
plan for the public acquisition of Nationwide Arena (hereafter referred to as the PANA Plan) is 
especially compelling considering the historic reluctance of Columbus voters to support such 
initiatives.  No referendum vote was taken on this most recent use of public funds. 
According to the PANA Plan, Nationwide Arena would be purchased by the Franklin 
County Convention Facilities Authority (FCCFA, representing the city and county) for $42.5 
million.  When accounting for arena upgrades and projected operating (e.g., utilities, 
maintenance and janitorial service, game day personnel; Greenberg, 2000) and capital 
expenditures (e.g., scoreboard upgrades; Bell, 2012), the total cost of the transaction would be 
$53.3 million.  To pay for the arena, the FCCFA would receive a $43.3-million loan from 
Nationwide Realty Investors and a $10-million loan from the Ohio Department of Development, 
$5 million of which would be forgiven if the Blue Jackets met “certain roster and payroll 
requirements” (City of Columbus, 2011, p. 10).  The city’s and county’s payment obligations 
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would be repaid using casino-generated tax revenue.  In 2009, Ohio voters had passed a 
constitutional amendment that authorized the development of casinos—one each in the state’s 
four most populous cities: Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, and Toledo.  Under the amendment, 
the state stood to collect 33% of the casino’s gross revenues, to be distributed among Ohio’s 88 
counties (O. Const. amend. to art. XV, § 6, repealed 2010).  On October 3, 2011, the Columbus 
city council approved the purchase of Nationwide Arena using this revenue; on December 19, 
Franklin County’s three commissioners gave unanimous approval (Trimble, 2011).  The 
purchase closed on March 28, 2012 (Caruso, 2012). 
It seems counterintuitive for elected officials to enact policies that are unreflective of 
popular sentiment, given both their job description as representatives of the public and their 
dependence on public support to keep their jobs in future elections.  As has been argued in the 
past, circumventing the directly democratic process increases the likelihood of securing public 
financing for a stadium initiative, but at the potential expense of organizational legitimacy (Fort, 
1997; Kellison & Mondello, 2012).  In the Columbus case, therefore, we might have expected 
that knowledge of previously rejected referenda would persuade policymakers to initiate a 
referendum for the current electorate in order to assess whether Columbus residents had changed 
their minds regarding public subsidization of an arena.  Contrary to that expectation, 
policymakers implemented a plan without seeking public approval.  The present study addresses 
how decision-makers reconciled their circumvention of a referendum with the aforementioned 
characteristics of their positions.  In consideration of the policymakers’ perspective in this case, 
we use the section below to integrate previous literature on political decision-making to argue 
that government actors justify the potential incompatibility of their decisions with public opinion 
by rationalizing that the policies serve the best interests of the local collective. 
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Civic Paternalism 
In the case of the Columbus Blue Jackets and Nationwide Arena, community resentment 
was expected by policymakers, as illustrated by Columbus city auditor Hugh Dorrian in a 2011 
interview in the Columbus Dispatch.  He attempted to deflect the anticipated public criticism by 
arguing that the PANA Plan was significantly different from plans voters had rejected in the past.  
He noted that all referenda previously rejected by Franklin County voters included regressive 
sales-tax increases; because the latest subsidization plan differed insofar as its funding apparatus 
was casino-generated revenues, local residents would not be directly affected, assuming they 
chose not to patronize the casino (Caruso, 2011). 
Still, the decision to pursue public financing for Nationwide Arena despite anticipated 
taxpayer disapproval suggests that decision-makers in Columbus believe they possess greater 
knowledge of civic issues than do their constituents.  This belief exemplifies civic paternalism, a 
political decision-making strategy grounded in a trustee form of representation and the belief that 
a city’s economic growth will optimally benefit the local collective.  Sometimes, acts motivated 
by civic paternalism may contradict community sentiment.  As discussed below, civically 
paternalistic leaders justify such decisions by pointing to their belief that a given policy serves 
the best interests of the entire community—even if community members do not realize that is so. 
Theoretical Foundations 
Urban growth machines. Literature on the urban growth machine helps to explain the 
political fascination with the professional sport stadium.  As Molotch (1976) argued, “the 
political and economic essence of virtually any given locality, in the present American context, is 
growth” (pp. 309-310).  In his view, the underlying desire for growth and expansion unites local 
decision-makers who otherwise have little in common.  Generally, developmental policies 
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designed to elicit positive economic benefits (as opposed to allocational or redistributive 
policies) are well received by the voting public (Peterson, 1981).  For that reason, city leaders 
tend to support professional sports and stadiums “as instruments of economic development and 
affirmations of the importance of their city or metropolitan area” (Danielson, 1997, p. 15). 
As noted in previous research, several broad factors are influential in stadium-finance 
decision-making.  Delaney and Eckstein (2003) investigated the influence of local growth 
coalitions—alliances between a city’s business elite, who often have major stakes in the securing 
of public funds for a facility—on stadium-financing outcomes.  They compared cities with strong 
growth coalitions (e.g., Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Cincinnati) with those with weak growth 
coalitions (e.g., Denver, Phoenix) and concluded that the strength of the growth coalition was a 
significant influencer of stadium-finance outcomes.  Similarly, Paul and Brown (2001) found 
that unified support from a region’s elite class increased the probability a stadium issue would 
pass.  More recently, Delaney and Eckstein (2007) explored the influence of growth coalitions in 
Cincinnati and Minneapolis by conducting interviews with over 70 individuals, many of whom 
were high-level executives and business leaders, involved in each city’s facility debates.  They 
offered several possible explanations for the pursuit of stadium initiatives by growth coalitions 
and policymakers, including executive recruitment and to assuage declining urban populations. 
The political power of the growth coalition is rooted in the theory of collective action 
(Euchner, 1993).  This theory holds that it is easier for a city’s business elite to organize than it is 
for smaller groups with diverse interests to do so.  Because the business elites share the objective 
of a prosperous local economy, they often ally and invest in projects designed to obtain that 
common goal.  On the other hand, anti-subsidy groups may be opposed to public stadium 
funding for numerous reasons (e.g., fiscal conservatism, opportunity costs); therefore, they may 
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not form a unified group.  As a result, economic issues often take precedence over social issues 
in a city’s political landscape.  The political power of these groups means that policymakers 
seeking reelection benefit from endorsing projects that benefit the coalition. 
Public choice theory and models of democratic representation. According to urban 
growth machine theory, elected officials are motivated to legislate in ways that will maximize 
their political welfare and minimize their political risk.  Previous analyses of stadium-financing 
cases have resulted in similar claims.  For example, Santo (2010) drew from public choice 
theory, the economic theory that individuals are motivated by their own self-interests, to contend 
that “politicians are not driven by an altruistic desire to serve the public interest but rather by a 
desire to promote their own self-interest” (p. 86). 
In the political science literature, several generic models of representation have been 
proposed to explain whether elected officials rely on their own expertise or consult their 
constituents.  In a trustee form of representation, elected officials have “an electoral incentive to 
use [their] expertise and pursue policies that [they believe] promote the general welfare” (Fox & 
Shotts, 2009, p. 1225).  Conversely, elected officials adhering to the delegate form of 
representation are politically motivated to enact policies that reflect popular opinion, regardless 
of their personal expertise.  A third type of representative, the politico, will alternate between the 
previous two forms depending on the degree to which an issue has polarized the public.  Each of 
the three representative forms is similar because all assume elected officials will adopt the model 
with the greatest electoral incentive. 
Democracy and paternalism. Ben-Ishai (2012) noted, “individual autonomy—the 
capacity to determine one’s own ends or life plans—is a central value in liberal democracies” (p. 
151).  Therefore, some question whether a paternalistic state can rightly be called a democracy.  
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Dworkin (1971) defined paternalism as “the interference with a person’s liberty of action 
justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or 
values of the person being coerced” (p. 108).  Paternalism is modeled on the traditional father-
child relationship, in which the father holds absolute authority over his children; his decisions, 
though sometimes unpopular, are always made in the best interests of his family (i.e., “father 
knows best”; Jackman, 1994).  However, despite the apparent benevolence in the father-child 
relationship, there is a wide range of opinion regarding the value of paternalism (Pellegrini & 
Scandura, 2008). 
The concept of civic paternalism emerges from a Rousseauian interpretation of the role 
an individual plays in shaping the larger will of the people as a collective.  In The Social 
Contract, Rousseau contended that the general will—and the laws emerging from that general 
will—reflect the best interests of society.  Taking for granted that the general will (what he refers 
to as the Sovereign) is always right and just, Rousseau acknowledged that an individual’s self-
interests may be trumped by the general will: 
As soon as this multitude is so united in one body, it is impossible to offend against one 
of the members without attacking the body, and still more to offend against the body 
without the members resenting it.  Duty and interest therefore equally oblige the two 
contracting parties to give each other help; and the same men should seek to combine, in 
their double capacity, all the advantages dependent upon that capacity. 
Again, the Sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, 
neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and consequently the sovereign 
power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible for the body to wish 
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to hurt all its members. …The Sovereign, merely by virtue of what it is, is always what it 
should be. (1762/2007, I.VII) 
Rousseau argued that once a collection of individuals develops into a society, they form a new 
organism complete with its own unique fate.  Therefore, society’s general will may be distinct 
from the will of its individual members; in such cases Rousseau held that the general will 
prevails. 
According to the paternalist philosophy, the popular opinion of a community may be 
worthy of consideration, but ultimately, only those with decision-making power (sovereigns) 
know which decisions will best serve the collective’s interests.  An understanding of 
policymakers as civic paternalists thus differs from the models described above in that it sees 
policymakers as more interested in the effects of their decisions on the entire community than on 
either their allies in the business elite or their future electoral success.  However, we will argue 
that these models are potentially complementary, as civic paternalists may understand all three of 
these outcomes to be intrinsically related: what is best for the business elite is best for the entire 
community; recognizing that, the community will be likely to reelect these policymakers.  
Moreover, we will argue that a policymaker might endorse a no-vote subsidy in particular 
because evidence suggests that these actions—even when unpopular among the citizenry—may 
be politically inconsequential. 
Civic Paternalism in Columbus Arena Policy 
As illustrated in Figure 1, there are two unpopular outcomes of a sport stadium proposal 
that may be explained by civic paternalism: (a) voters reject a public-funding proposition but 
decision-makers nevertheless direct subsidies to the facility, as has been the case in cities like 
Pittsburgh and Charlotte (City Council of the City of Charlotte, 2002; Mecham, 2006); or (b) 
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legislators allow public investiture in a facility initiative without seeking the approval of local 
citizens, as has occurred in 24 facilities subsidized without voter consent since 2005. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Civic leaders faced with deciding whether to allocate public funding toward a 
professional sporting venue must consider the impact on a number of constituencies.  In 
Columbus, voters have traditionally rejected all proposals designed to subsidize local sports 
facilities.  After city council members and county commissioners agreed to purchase Nationwide 
Arena from a private insurance company (thereby “saving” the Columbus Blue Jackets, a 
privately owned sports organization; Caruso, 2011), questions were raised concerning the lack of 
citizen input.  Such a decision could be justified by the logic of civic paternalism, the view by 
political policymakers that they know better than their constituents how to achieve the common 
good. 
Methods 
Although the cities and stadiums listed in Table 1 share a common outcome, each case’s 
no-vote subsidy resulted from a series of unique events.  Therefore, it is important to consider 
context when forming an opinion about the appropriateness of a stadium’s financing.  In 
recognition of the influence of context, Santo (2005) advocated for an increase in case-study 
analyses in order to draw more precise conclusions: 
Case studies…which focus on one or a few cities…are able to inherently account for the 
context in which sports facilities are built.  This focus is important because…a facility’s 
ability to impact its local economy is tied to its context.  This point can be overlooked in 
the analysis and reporting of cross-section time-series research.  In addition, when the 
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results of numerous empirical analyses are synthesized into broad conclusions, the 
nuances of individual findings are eroded. (p. 190) 
Following the direction of Santo’s recommendation, standardized open-ended interviews 
were conducted in person with seven individuals connected to the Columbus PANA Plan.  Each 
individual was either a member of the working group who developed the plan, a Franklin County 
commissioner, or a Columbus city councilmember.  In sum, 15 individuals made up the 
membership of these three groups.  Members of the working group (though not necessarily 
participants in this study) included: Columbus mayor Michael B. Coleman; his chief of staff, 
Michael D. Reese; city council president Andrew J. Ginther; Franklin County commissioner 
John O’Grady; city auditor Hugh J. Dorrian; county administrator Don L. Brown; special 
counsel to the city John C. Rosenberger; and executive director of the county convention 
facilities authority, William C. Jennison.  Of the seven participants, three were elected officials 
who had direct votes on the PANA Plan, while the remaining four were members of the working 
group.  The interviews were conducted in each individual’s office or conference area.  Interviews 
were recorded and transcribed verbatim.  Interviews ranged in length from 18 min 5 sec to 1 hr 
14 min 44 sec; the average length was 37 min 41 sec.  Data were analyzed in the tripartite 
sequence suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990).  The interview responses are being reported 
largely in the form of verbatims to support interpretive validity (Johnson & Christensen, 2008). 
Furthermore, between-method triangulation was utilized to improve the internal 
trustworthiness of the interview responses.  In addition to the interview testimony, official and 
internal documents (e.g., meeting minutes, city ordinance proposals, county resolutions) and 
press coverage of the PANA Plan were analyzed.  Following the guidelines of Fico, Lacy, and 
Riffe (2008), the researchers grouped “expressions” into categories through the development of a 
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multi-stage coding protocol.  In the first stage, primary expressions were categorized according 
to a number of recurring themes throughout the literature (e.g., urban growth machine, 
democratic representation).  Following the identification of the primary themes, each document 
was analyzed and assigned, when applicable, to the aforementioned themes.  When necessary, 
articles were coded into multiple themes.  In cases where the anonymity of the public official can 
be protected, external support of her or his statement is provided. 
In the results presented below, each interviewee has been assigned a pseudonym.  
Individuals who had direct votes in the PANA Plan (i.e., city councilmembers, county 
commissioners) are preceded with the title “Elected Official.”  These individuals represent the 
policymakers of interest.  Non-voting members—all of whom were members of the city’s arena-
financing working group—are assigned the title “Executive.”  These individuals were actively 
involved in the development of the PANA Plan and worked alongside the policymakers.  
Therefore, their personal accounts provide further insight on the decision-making processes of 
the policymakers.  Finally, to protect the anonymity of the interviewees, consistent gender 
pronouns have been assigned to both groups: members of the Elected Officials group are referred 
to as male, while members of the Executive group are referred to as female. 
This qualitative research design was utilized for discovery, description, and theory 
development (Rudd & Johnson, 2010).  The purpose of the interviews was to gain insight about 
the projected benefits of, perceived opposition to, and level of public support toward the 
Columbus PANA Plan, from the perspective of the policymakers.  This pseudo-grounded theory 
approach takes into account the importance of fit, understanding, generality, and control (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967).  More generally, the interviewers’ responses inform the civic-paternalism 
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conceptualization.  As shown below, two primary themes emerged from our analyses, both of 
which describe what policymakers think about when deliberating about no-vote subsidies. 
Results and Discussion 
“Good policy and good politics”: Trustee support of the growth machine. 
Policymakers sometimes make decisions that may be unpopular among a portion of their many 
constituents, who include ordinary citizens, business leaders, and special interest groups.  With 
respect to the Columbus arena-financing case, in interviews policymakers expressed support for 
the PANA Plan based on a number of reasons, all of which had to do with maintaining or 
bolstering the urban growth machine.  These reasons included supporting “a vital Arena 
District,” averting a “shot to the ego” of a prospering city, and protecting “10,000 jobs.”  
However, policymakers were quick to connect the city’s economic growth with the quality of life 
of ordinary citizens.  As argued by Executive Nicklaus, the defense-of-jobs issue was 
particularly important considering the troublesome economic climate since the late 2000s: “I 
think people understood, especially in a time of a recession, that fighting for every job and 
retaining every job you can is good policy and good politics.”  Highlighting the central 
arguments for the Arena District, Executive Owens argued that action was necessary in order to 
keep the Blue Jackets financially solvent and sustain the district’s attractiveness: 
I think just the economic development [inaudible] jobs is at the top of the list, and right 
before that, it seems to me, would be the community image with—our competition with 
our peer municipalities….  This has to do with the citing of future jobs.  It has to do with 
the tourism.  It has to do with—where the young intelligentsia is choosing to live.…  
Would you want to live someplace that’s a little boring or do you want to live someplace 
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where they’ve got some professional sports?  Where there’s some buzz….  It gives them 
cache with that demographic. 
Otherwise, the team would likely have relocated, thereby leaving the arena without a central 
tenant, which would cause economic distress throughout the district.  The threat of relocation, 
though not introduced by Blue Jackets’ management, had appeared in press coverage (e.g., 
Brown, 2011; Caruso, 2011; Hart, 2011), and other policymakers echoed the importance of 
avoiding relocation throughout the interviews. 
A key assumption among civically paternalistic actors is that, while they themselves are 
aware of how a decision impacts an entire community, private individuals lack the same breadth 
of knowledge and are instead motivated by self-interests.  This assumption is epitomized in the 
following response by Elected Official Hayes: 
I think that when I look at things like this vote, I look at the fact that I’m looking at a 
whole big picture.  So, in that respect, I’m thinking about a much bigger picture than an 
individual voter might be thinking about.  I don’t know.  I think about a lot of what I do 
as: is this in the best interests of the community?  I’ll listen to perspectives; I always am 
willing to listen to perspectives and I read the letters that come in, and in the end, I will 
vote based on what I believe makes the most sense.  And looking at all the pieces and 
parts of everything else going on, I don’t get pressured by outside influences, so I don’t 
feel that pressure.  There was pressure out there to support this, but I didn’t really feel 
that pressure. 
Furthermore, those involved in the PANA Plan reinforced the belief that the majority of citizens 
were either uninterested or uninformed when it came to the specifics of the deal.  This position 
was supported by Kraft and Furlong (2007), who argued, “The attentive public can be 
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distinguished from the general public.  The attentive public, typically less than 10 percent of the 
public, includes those who are apt to take an interest in a particular problem or policy” (p. 52).  
While Elected Official Hayes confessed, “I don’t think most residents care,” Executive Owens 
stated that although public awareness of the Blue Jackets’ grim financial situation was strong, 
understanding of how the PANA Plan worked was much weaker: 
…It’s a pretty complicated deal, and let’s face it, for most people, the most complicated 
thing they’ve ever done is buy a house.  And so, all of this is just meaningless.  They sort 
of look at the net result, which is, “All right, they stay in town.  All right, I understand 
that creates some jobs.  Yeah, that’s sort of important to our image, I get that.  Nobody’s 
going to send me a new tax bill.”  For most people: “I’m not in the safety net, so that’s 
not material to me.”  I mean, it’s one of those things that people just use fuzzy logic on 
and decide, “Oh, yeah.  OK.  Next.  What’s the next issue?” 
Her contention that ordinary citizens lacked both awareness and understanding of the plan’s 
particulars typifies the trustee orientation of the civically paternalistic leader.  According to 
Owens, the ordinary citizen grasped only the broad implications of the deal.  Though not stated 
by Owens, this excerpt suggests that the representative form of democracy was most appropriate 
in the Columbus arena-financing case because an uninformed and uninvolved citizenry is not 
ideal in a direct democracy. 
Even though they defended the no-vote subsidy, policymakers in Columbus speculated 
about whether the community would have supported the plan had it gone to a public vote.  
Predictions varied, but no policymaker voiced concern that the issue would have been defeated 
in a landslide.  As one interviewee contended, a key factor in the hypothetical outcome of a vote 
is whether the electorate would have valued the arena’s discounted cost.  Additionally, Executive 
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Harley deferred to the city council and county commission’s support of the deal as an expression 
of the will of the people: 
The elected officials are sort of my gauge as to where the public is because the mayor had 
to approve it, seven city councilmembers had to approve it, and three county 
commissioners…and they run for election, they know the voters, and in working with 
them, I think we came up with a package that they felt would meet voter muster if it had 
to go to that.  They’re pretty sophisticated when it comes to understanding the electorate 
and I think they felt that, on balance, this was a good proposal. 
This response is indicative of Harley’s assumption that policymakers were acting democratically 
by making decisions representing the desires of their electorate. 
Interestingly, Elected Official Griffin emphatically predicted voters would have passed 
the arena issue.  The reason, he explained, is that the local government would have created a 
public campaign to highlight the benefits of the Arena District: 
If you had to hold—if we put this to a public vote this past fall and said, “Fund it or don’t 
fund it,” even in the environment we’re in now, it would have passed.  I still believe it 
would have passed…and the reason it would have passed is Nationwide and the Blue 
Jackets and the county commissioners and the mayor and everybody else—we would 
have put on a public campaign.  They would have paid for TV commercials; we’d have 
all been in them and we would’ve talk about the impact that the arena had—arena district 
has—on Columbus.  They would have showed pictures of it.  You could have—it 
wouldn’t have even been close.  I wouldn’t even think it would have been close.  Now, if 
it was a straight-up vote—ask me right now—then maybe it would have been closer.  But 
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not after 30 to 60 days of TV commercials and an explanation of what it is.  No.  It 
wouldn’t have even have been close.  We would have won that vote in a heartbeat. 
Griffin argued that a highly publicized campaign would have informed the public about the 
reasons why subsidizing the arena was important to the city.  In his view, this information was 
already known by elected officials, but members of the community needed educating in order to 
come to the same realizations.  From Griffin’s perspective, after the message got out to the 
public, the imperative of approving the PANA Plan would be seen by all. 
As the above responses indicate, policymakers involved in the Columbus PANA Plan 
overwhelmingly believed the public majority lacked comprehension of the plan’s details.  
Certainly, they did not argue that the public was incapable of such understanding (indeed, the 
suggested strategy of a pro-subsidy publicity campaign indicates a belief that the public could be 
educated on the topic), but rather, that the public was simply apathetic to the case.  Additionally, 
the policymakers expressed faith that a review by Franklin County voters would have had a 
favorable outcome; however, their answers to this hypothetical question (with the exception of 
the Griffin’s testimony) commonly exuded a lack of certainty. 
The promise of urban growth was an important part of the Franklin County 
policymakers’ rationalization for the PANA Plan.  In some cases, they acknowledged that some 
citizens might oppose the funding apparatus or any professional sports subsidy.  Additionally, 
they conceded that some voters would prefer that casino revenues be directed toward improving 
schools, infrastructure, and civil services.  In response to these concerns, interviewees suggested 
investment in growth would lead to additional resources for other programs and projects.  This 
idea is reflective of a civically paternalistic ideology; while cognizant of opposing views (and the 
potential political consequences of enacting policies that contradicted popular views), civically 
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paternalistic leaders rely on their personal expertise to legislate in ways that secure their cities’ 
continued growth.  This growth, in their view, will best serve the public will. 
 “I’ll worry about that when the time comes”: The political consequences of the no-
vote subsidy. When an act of civic paternalism might not be supported by the public, 
policymakers must come to terms with the possible political consequences of their decisions.  
Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997) found that politicians who were confident they would be reelected 
were more likely to begin new projects around election season, while those who were less certain 
of their electability were less likely to engage in new ventures.  Elected officials are considerate 
of the political consequences of their decisions.  In Executive Nicklaus’ words: 
Yeah, I think there’s tension there.  Any elected official—whether you’re term limited or 
not; or whether you have two-year terms, four-year terms; whether you’re a mayor, 
councilmember, country commissioner, [representative], whatever—I think anyone has in 
their mind, “How is this going to impact me the next time I run?” or, “How am I going to 
be viewed, whether I’m running or not?”  You know, I think that that’s natural. 
One policymaker commented specifically on the political risk taken by some freshman 
councilmembers.  When asked if any of the elected officials were susceptible to losing a council 
seat from their adoption of the PANA Plan, Elected Official Griffin responded, “Absolutely.”  
As he elaborated, it was unclear how the public would respond to the city council and county 
commission’s adoption of the arena-financing plan: 
…There was definitely some concern that the two new appointed city councilmembers—
very good folks—they’re turning out to be great councilmembers—but had never been on 
a ballot before—running for their first time and voting for this thing that, you know—
there really hadn’t been any polls… The council president had done polls internally, but 
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there hadn’t been any public polls, so there was no real knowledge or understanding of 
what really the public thought. 
This statement provides insight into the policymakers’ gauge of public support.  Griffin noted 
that no member of the city council or county commission was aware of the public’s opinion 
toward the plan.  This reflects the trustee orientation of policymakers, who believed their 
expertise on the issue, coupled with the perceived lack of knowledge of citizens, made analysis 
of public opinion unnecessary. 
There was at least some trepidation that the arena-financing plan could inflame some 
voters.  In the passage below, Elected Official Griffin spoke at length to the initial reluctance of 
some political leaders to develop an arena-financing plan during election season: 
…There were at different times when there were some political leaders in this town that 
wanted to just say, “Let’s get through an issue”; “let’s get through an election”;  “let’s get 
through…,” you know, those type of things.  But, they never said, “I don’t want to talk 
about this” or “let’s forget that idea.”  They might say, “Let’s forget it for six months,” 
but they wouldn’t say, “Let’s forget it.” 
And there were times when I think people were…even like, “Aw, I don’t want to 
deal with that right now.”  But nobody that I know of…said, “I will not support that.”  
Not one.  And it took—well it took heavy lifting.  The mayor had to lift, and then it took 
seven votes at city council, and three votes [from the commissioners]—well, four votes at 
city council and two votes [from the county commission]—but again, it passed 
unanimously, both places.  So, I mean, I think that’s…an important point to make.  It’s 
not like this was politically contentious.  It was just—there were times and things going 
on—environmental issues that were happening throughout this conversation that at 
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different times said, “You know what?  Let’s get this taken care of before we deal with 
that.”  “Let’s get past this election before we deal with that.” 
The apprehension of Franklin County policymakers to engage in negotiations about the Arena 
District suggests that at least some leaders were concerned about how their actions would impact 
their favorability among their constituents. 
Although the lack of a collective opposition may have soothed the consciences of some 
policymakers, the voices of a few opponents were still memorable.  Elected Official Griffin 
recounted a specific incident in which an acquaintance offered his unfavorable opinion of the 
deal: 
I have had people come up to me of all walks of life and say, “What?  Why would you do 
that?”  I even had an attorney here in town—very well respected—we know him…who 
cornered me and got in my face at a Christmas party and…pretty much pinned me up 
against the table and railed on me about this and I just—“Hey, look.  We’re not ever 
going to agree on this, so just drop it.  It’s just where we are.” 
As Executive Owens remarked, some opponents lacked compelling arguments and were instead 
fueled by indiscriminant antagonism: 
…To tell you this—when I got asked to do this, I’d been around for a long time and not 
been vilified or anything like that.  I’m getting along OK.  So anyway, I agreed to do this 
and I logged onto Dispatch or something.  I don’t know what it was.  I found this place 
where people can leave anonymous comments.  Oh, it was brutal.  Oh my god, it was 
breathtaking.  In fact, after a few minutes, I thought, I can’t read this.  This is just going 
to screw me up.  I’m not going read this.  Every once in awhile, somebody would say, 
“Oh, she’s a good person.”  There were those who would just cut me to ribbons.  So, I’ll 
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tell you, those people are out there and they’re not even not necessarily principled, 
they’re just caught up in anger at everything. 
These events, while uncommon, provided evidence to decision-makers that some community 
members were displeased with the PANA Plan. 
From a political perspective, elected officials were faced with choosing between two 
philosophical points of view, as explained by Executive Owens: 
…We know policymakers have to exist in the middle, and…I think the middle is the 
place that you need to be. …I’ve watched over the years, these decisions that come on 
about are we going to deploy resources to strengthen the safety net and expand the safety 
net—whatever—or are we going to do things that create jobs, that keep people out of the 
safety net?  That’s the toughest decision that really comes on, and there are passions on 
both sides of this thing.  You understand.  It’s inflamed by the passions of the electorate 
and all of those are visited on these poor policymakers that have to make these tough 
decisions. 
The above statement illustrates the tensions felt by policymakers.  Within the context of welfare 
issues, policymakers are aware of the opposing arguments within their individual constituencies.  
In the stadium-financing context, some may favor investing in ways that protect individuals from 
economic crises (e.g., by investing in economic engines such as stadiums in order to promote the 
health of the urban growth machine), while others may support sending direct aid to those most 
in need (e.g., by investing in welfare programs and homeless shelters).  While the majority 
opinion would certainly be worthy of consideration, an act of civic paternalism would be based 
primarily on what the decision-maker believed would serve the best interests of the entire 
community. 
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Though policymakers engaging in acts of civic paternalism must be willing to face the 
political consequences of their actions when their decisions contradict public sentiment, negative 
consequences do not always result.  In some cases, voters may not penalize an official in the next 
election; elected officials are equally aware of this potential outcome.  Electoral slack refers to 
situations in which “governments believe that they are in a strong enough position to absorb the 
electoral consequences of unpopular decisions” (Pierson, 1996, p. 176).  While the possibility for 
political fallout existed for some policymakers (specifically, the Columbus city council’s 
freshman members), Elected Official Griffin expressed confidence that even an unpopular 
decision would not have harmed his reelection bid: 
You know, there are things that we do that you know it’s a tough vote.  Believe me.  
About—I’d say one out of 15 or 20 votes that you take, you’re [upsetting someone].  
Maybe not even that—it might even be even less than that—maybe one out of every 10 
votes that you make, you’re [upsetting someone].  But—and I think I’m in a little bit of a 
different situation for a lot of reasons, political and other—…I’m pretty good at the 
political stuff, so I put myself in a pretty good political position so that I don’t have to 
worry that—at least in terms of reelection. 
Elected Official Hayes similarly felt protected by his electoral slack: “I don’t think it was that big 
of a risk.” 
While the policymakers indicated the perceived low risk associated with supporting the 
PANA Plan, they also acknowledged that sometimes their unpopular decisions could lead to 
negative consequences.  The possibility of losing their positions in government weighed heavily 
on the elected policymakers.  In the end, the importance of doing what they considered “right” 
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overruled concerns about their political futures, as reflected in the decision-making processes of 
two elected officials.  As stated by Elected Official Hayes: 
I think elected officeholders take risks all the time.  If you’re going to lead, you’re going 
to lead.  Sometimes, we make decisions that people don’t like.  Sometimes, we make 
decisions people like.  So, is there a risk?  Of course, there’s a risk that when we’re up for 
reelection, somebody may bring it up.  I don’t know how this will be, but in the end—I 
can’t speak for anybody else—but I have to say, for me, I do what I think is right at the 
time I do it.  And I felt that this was the best, right thing to do and I don’t have any 
problem at all when it’s time for me to run for reelection in [2014] standing up for that 
decision. 
Similarly, Elected Official Griffin commented: 
I think about it when I’m flying home from Washington or when I’m up late at night that 
some of the things that I’ve decided on might make it difficult for me to run for a 
different office someday.  I’ll worry about that when the time comes, but I’m not going to 
not do the right thing because of that. 
In the end, policymakers in Columbus had to come to terms with the possibility that their 
decisions could curtail their future political endeavors.  In acts of civic paternalism, this 
realization is necessary in order for policymakers to lead without the endorsement of the 
electorate. 
Since these interviews were conducted, a grassroots organization known as the Columbus 
Coalition for Responsive Government initiated an amendment that would block public payments 
to Nationwide Arena beginning in 2016.  This amendment, which would be subject to a public 
vote, would effectively repeal the arena-financing deal.  Should this citizen-led initiative prove 
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successful, Franklin County policymakers might reappraise the political consequences of 
supporting the PANA Plan.  Charges that the PANA Plan is unconstitutional have also emerged, 
but these criticisms have focused on fiscal provisions in the Ohio Constitution rather than the 
decision-making process (Ebersole, 2013). 
Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we contended that civic paternalism enabled policymakers to justify the 
Columbus PANA Plan, a decision that may or may not have been representative of the 
community collective.  Some may question the validity or honesty of the testimony provided by 
the PANA Plan policymakers; others outside of the decision-making process might give very 
different accounts of how and why the process unfolded as it did.  Still, the results of the 
interviews are valuable as a public record of the PANA Plan policymakers’ justification for the 
no-vote subsidy.  The city councilmembers and county commissioners interviewed for this study 
all attempted to reconcile the seeming inconsistency between their positions as representatives 
and their failure to seek public opinion through a vote by arguing that the PANA Plan was best 
for the entire community, and would be even if voters who disagreed later voted elected officials 
out of office.  The validity of an interview participant’s testimony is always subject to scrutiny; 
in this study, readers must assess the trustworthiness of the statements given.  In some ways, this 
methodological concern and the electoral process are harmonious, as voters too must decide how 
to interpret these justifications. 
If any single theme emerging from these interviews was to be contested, it would likely 
be policymakers’ claim that they act in ways that benefit the entire community.  Given the 
seldom known but presumably conflicting opinions of citizens, Peterson (1981) defined the 
general will as an assembly of economic, social, and political interests: 
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The interests of cities are neither a summation of individual interests nor the pursuit of 
optimum size.  Instead, policies and programs can be said to be in the interest of cities 
whenever the policies maintain or enhance the economic position, social prestige, or 
political power of the city, taken as a whole. (p. 20) 
With respect to the PANA Plan, the potential relocation of the Columbus Blue Jackets and loss 
of Nationwide Arena’s primary tenant could have triggered the economic collapse of the Arena 
District, resulting in massive layoffs, business closings, and the idling of downtown residential 
activity.  Stated differently, the loss of the Blue Jackets could have reversed the significant 
downtown growth of the past 15 years.  This scenario was outlined by multiple PANA Plan 
policymakers, who argued such a decline would hurt not only those directly impacted through 
job or revenue loss, but all Franklin County residents.  Thus, while some individuals have 
enjoyed the benefits of a thriving downtown Columbus more than others, all residents are 
impacted by the urban growth machine. 
This study makes several broad contributions to the academic study of both sport and 
public policy.  First, we underscore the prevalence of the no-vote subsidy as an instrument of 
public-stadium financing.  Much of the controversy surrounding the no-vote subsidy comes from 
the uncertainty about the preference of the public will.  Without the evidence of ballot results or 
poll numbers, individuals can suppose the will of the people at large matches their own 
preferences. The policymaker favoring the financing plan may speculate the public to be 
similarly supportive, while the dissenting citizen may argue that the public majority opposes the 
plan.  Civil servants and citizens alike must consider the consequences of policies that are—at 
least in perception and sometimes in reality—unreflective of the electorate’s preferences. 
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As we highlight the increasing prevalence of the no-vote subsidy in North American 
stadium financing, we also acknowledge that there are forms of democratic participation other 
than a popular vote by local citizens (cf. Held, 2006).  For example, town-hall forums and public 
hearings may provide policymakers with a perspective of the public will when direct democracy 
is not utilized.  In fact, some governments have created statutes aimed at formalizing the citizen-
participation process by requiring community feedback on legislative changes (i.e., New 
Zealand’s Local Government Acts of 1989 and 2002; Sam & Scherer, 2006).  However, previous 
research has shown that these meetings are often significantly impacted by local policymakers’ 
political agendas.  For example, Scherer and Sam (2008) analyzed the content of five public 
meetings, at which citizens deliberated on the use of public funds for the $143-million 
renovation of Carisbrook, a rugby stadium in Dunedin, New Zealand.  The researchers observed 
a number of coercive tactics and politicking in the meetings, and argued that those with a vested 
interest in the facility (e.g., city officials, the firm commissioned to evaluate the feasibility of the 
stadium, rugby supporters, wealthy businesspeople) were using their positions to alter the 
structure of a supposedly democratic process in order to garner more favor for the stadium.  
Scherer and Sam’s work demonstrates that there are democratic alternatives to referendums and 
initiatives, but these alternatives are not necessarily immune from political influence. 
A number of other analyses of the politics behind sport stadium-finance deals have been 
structured as historical accounts (e.g., Curry et al., 2004; Mason, 2010; Mondello, Schwester, & 
Humphreys, 2009; Trumpbour, 2006).  Other investigations have centered on the makeup of 
assorted stakeholders, including voters (Coates & Humphreys, 2006; Mondello & Anderson, 
2004), political leaders (Carr, 2009), and elite endorsers (Paul & Brown, 2006).  Still others have 
focused on the alleged benefits and detriments of a publicly financed stadium (e.g., Delaney & 
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Eckstein, 2003; deMause & Cagan, 2008; Rosentraub, 2010; Zimbalist, 2004).  This project 
encompasses each of these elements in order to provide a critical account of the Columbus 
PANA Plan. 
Second, we conceptualized and defined civic paternalism.  Although the literature on 
political influence in stadium financing has been widespread (e.g., Austrian & Rosentraub, 1997; 
Blair & Swindell, 1997; Rosentraub, 1999; Weiner, 2000), less scholarship has examined the 
motives and decision-making processes of elected officials from the perspective of individual 
policymakers.  A consideration of this perspective is necessary in order to appreciate the nuances 
of the decision-making process.  In addition, in the case of the Columbus PANA Plan, it is 
necessary to identify what reasoning, if any, was used by policymakers to legitimate the 
allocation of public funding to Nationwide Arena without the consent of local citizens.  In our 
interviews, policymakers endorsed subsidizing the arena to save businesses, jobs, and social 
capital—in other words, to promote the urban growth machine—but insisted that these benefits 
would be widely shared by the entire community. 
Policymakers were aware of the possibility that Franklin County residents might not 
agree with their support of the PANA Plan.  The ideology of civic paternalism is one way in 
which policymakers are able to temper any personal apprehension caused by the possibility of 
public disapproval.  However, we hesitate to imply that this attitude is always or necessarily 
dishonest.  Our interviews suggest that the attitude of civic paternalism may be not merely a false 
rhetoric intended to make unpopular decisions more palatable to the public, but may play an 
actual role in the prospective decision-making process, as policymakers justify their possibly 
unpopular decisions to themselves.  What remains unclear is how local citizens respond to this 
type of justification.  The no-vote subsidy has quickly become the most common form of public 
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financing for professional sport facilities in North America.  While some researchers have 
included voter characteristics in their broader analyses of the public-private facility financing 
debate (Brown & Paul, 2002; Fort, 1997, 1999; Mondello & Anderson, 2004), there has not been 
empirical investigation of the responding opinions and behaviors following no-vote subsidies. 
The most immediate outcome of a pro-subsidy policy is that public funds are allocated to 
a stadium or project; clearly, this outcome is favored by the policymakers behind it.  It is unclear 
if other, more problematic outcomes also emerge from such policies.  Future research should 
focus on identifying these outcomes, which may include reduced favorability toward the 
policymakers, declining belief in democratic ideals, and increased apathy toward the democratic 
process.  These outcomes represent potential unintended, yet severe, consequences of policies 
made without voter consent and should be the subject of future empirical study. 
Finally, the development of civic paternalism as a policymaker motive pushes the sport 
management discipline in new directions, including that of interdisciplinary research, which has 
recently been championed by Doherty (2013).  Given the high cost, visibility, and symbolism of 
professional sports facilities, there is sufficient reason to expand stadium-politics research into 
the other academies such as public policy, political science, organizational theory, and urban and 
regional planning.  From a scholarly perspective, researchers should continue to engage in 
interdisciplinary research moving forward.  It is difficult to appreciate the nuance and complexity 
of the no-vote subsidy from any one perspective, and incorporating knowledge from a wide 
range of disciplines can bring to light new ideas for evaluating the merits of public-stadium 
financing and the democratic process.  The aim of this interdisciplinary approach, then, should 
be to engage the academy, policymakers, activists, sport managers, and ordinary citizens in such 
worthwhile debate. 
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Figure 1. Possible sport facility financing outcomes with public interests, with attention drawn to 
the scenarios in which civic paternalism could be applicable.  This model includes the 
procedures for making decisions, possible procedure outcomes, and possible financing outcomes.  
The relationships between (a) fail (procedure outcome) and public (financing outcome) and (b) 
legislation (procedure outcome) and public (financing outcome) reflect the potential presence of 
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Table 1.1: North American Professional Sport Facilities Receiving Public Funding Since 2005 
 









Miami Marlins MLB Marlins Ballpark   2012   $645   $490 76%  no 
Minnesota Twins MLB Target Field   2010   $555   $356 64%  no 
New York Mets MLB Citi Field   2009   $830   $614 74%  no 
New York Yankees MLB Yankee Stadium   2009   $2,308  $1,186 51%  no 
Kansas City Royals MLB Kaufmann Stadium   2009*   $250   $175 70%    yes^ 
Washington Nationals MLB Nationals Park   2008   $693   $693 100%  no 
St. Louis Cardinals MLB Busch Stadium   2006   $365   $45 12%  no 
Houston Dynamo MLS BBVA Compass Stadium   2012   $95   $35 37%  no 
Sporting Kansas City MLS Livestrong Sporting Park   2011   $160   $80 50%  no 
Portland Timbers MLS Jeld-Wen Field   2011*   $36   $32 89%  no 
Vancouver Whitecaps FC MLS BC Place Stadium   2011*   $563   $563 100%  no 
New York Red Bulls MLS Red Bull Arena   2010   $200   $84 42%  no 
Philadelphia Union MLS PPL Park   2010   $120   $77 64%  no 
Real Salt Lake MLS Rio Tinto Stadium   2008   $110   $45 41%  no 
Colorado Rapids MLS Dick’s Sporting Goods Park   2007   $131   $66 50%    yes^ 
Toronto FC MLS BMO Field   2007   $63   $45 71%  no 
Chicago Fire MLS Toyota Park   2006   $98   $98 100%  no 
FC Dallas MLS FC Dallas Park   2005   $80   $80 100%  no 
Orlando Magic NBA Amway Center   2010   $480   $430 90%  no 
Brooklyn Nets NBA Barclays Center   2012   $772   $260 34%  no 
Charlotte Hornets NBA Time Warner Cable Arena   2005   $265   $265 100%     yes† 
Minnesota Vikings NFL New Minnesota Stadium   2016   $975   $498 51%  no 
New Orleans Saints NFL Mercedes-Benz Superdome   2011*   $336   $321 96%  no 
Kansas City Chiefs NFL Arrowhead Stadium   2010*   $375   $250 67%    yes^ 
Dallas Cowboys NFL Cowboys Stadium   2009   $1,150  $325 28%    yes^ 
Indianapolis Colts NFL Lucas Oil Stadium   2008   $720   $620 86%  no 
Arizona Cardinals NFL University of Phoenix Stadium   2006   $455   $332 73%  no 
Pittsburgh Penguins NHL CONSOL Energy Center   2010   $321   $244 76%  no 
New Jersey Devils NHL Prudential Center   2008   $375   $210 56%  no 
Note. Costs listed in US$ millions or C$ millions (respective to facility location). Figures rounded to nearest million; 
percentages rounded to nearest whole percent. For full reference list, please contact corresponding author.  
* renovated facility. ^ initiative/referendum passed. † referendum failed. MLB = Major League Baseball. MLS = 
Major League Soccer. NBA = National Basketball Association. NFL = National Football League. NHL = National 
Hockey League. 
 
 
